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REORGANIZING MINNESOTA'S JUDICIARY
A Layman's View
By

WILLIAM.N

ANDERSON*

T

iiis article aims to analyze the constitutional amendment proposed in the Report of the Committee on the Unification of
the Courts to the Judicial Council of Minnesota. The amendment
is so drawn as to constitute a complete substitute for Article VI
of the Minnesota Constitution. It will also affect incidentally a
number of other state constitutional provisions.
The proposal itself is one made by lawyers for that branch of
government in which they have a peculiar interest, the judiciary.
Tracing back through the literature one finds that the ideas
embodied in the proposed amendment have been developed almost
entirely by lawyers in speeches before the American and state bar
associations and in numerous articles contributed to the journal of
the American Bar Association, the Journal of the American
judicature Society, and various other legal periodicals. The committee that drew up the Minnesota plan consisted of twenty
lawyers and one layman. Although the ideas are therefore almost
entirely those of lawyers, the proposal is one that affects all people,
and a layman may perhaps be pardoned for venturing to analyze
what is proposed. As Aristotle pointed out there are some arts,
of which government is one, "whose products are not judged of
solely, or best, by the artists themselves, namely those aTts whose
products are recognized even by those who do not possess the art;
for example, the knowledge of the house is not limited to the
builder only; the user, or, in other words, the master, of the house
will be a better judge than the builder, just as the pilot will judge
better of a rudder than a carpenter, and the guest will judge better
of a feast than the cook."'
The author of this article is a layman in the sense that he is not
a lawyer. At the same time he brings to the analysis of the proposed amendment a certain amount of public experience and years
of study of government and administration. One of the functions
of a political scientist is to try to see each system of government as
a whole, and each part thereof in relation to others. This article
*Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
'Politics, Bk. III, ch. 11.
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will deal, therefore, not with minor and internal details of the
proposal but rather with its relationship to that responsible type
of popular government that is now called democracy.
THE PROPOSED A-mENDMIENT
The amendment provides for a drastic reorganization of the
entire judicial system of the state. Four major phases of the plan
may be separated out for discussion.
First. A General Court of Minnesota is created that is to
replace all the now-existing courts of the state. Thus all courts
set up by the Constitution (Supreme Court, District Courts, Probate Courts, and Justice Courts) and those created by act of the
legislature (municipal courts, special divisions of district and
municipal courts, and the office of court commissioner) will disappear as such, and their several jurisdictions will be absorbed
into that of the proposed General Court. The latter will then
have all the jurisdiction "at any time vested in the courts of this
state." This unification of the courts into a single highly-integrated
system is in line with modern thought and a certain amount of
foreign practice, especially English. It opens the way for a
smoother working of the judicial system as a whole, and promises
the elimination of the jurisdictional disputes and difficulties that
inhere in any system of separate courts each with its own jurisdiction.
For convenience of operation the General Court is divided
into three "divisions to be known as the supreme court, district
court, and county court." To each of these is assigned a certain
jurisdiction, but it is expressly provided that such jurisdiction
"shall not be exclusive, and no judicial action taken by any division . . . shall be void for want of jurisdiction. . . ." Furthermore
an administrative council is created, to consist of three judges
from each division, and this body is to have certain powers, to be
noted hereafter, to facilitate the work of all divisions of the
General Court.
Second. The administrative council mentioned above is something entirely new in the judicial organization of Minnesota. Each
of the three divisions of the General Court is to elect for terms
of two years three of its own members to serve on this council.
Its chairman will be the chief justice or an associate justice of
the supreme court designated by him. The council will appoint
a lawyer as the administrative director of the General Court. Acting through this director the council will control and supervise the
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administrative organization and operation of the General Court
and its several divisions. The council will also have power, among
other things, to make rules which, when approved by the supreme
court, may change the jurisdiction of district and county courts,
change the number and boundaries of district court districts,
designate the places for the sessions of district and county courts
and of the offices of court clerks, create subdivisions or departments of district and county courts, arrange for the assignment of
particular judges to various subdivisions, and provide for the review
of county and district court decisions at the district court level in
the larger districts. The pertinent provisions are quoted in a
later section.
Third. Popular election of judges and clerks in all courts is
practically eliminated, and so is nearly all the discretion to fill
vacancies that is now vested in the governor. (a) In each judicial
district the members of the bar will elect three lawyers of the
district to a district nominating committee, while the governor is
entitled to appoint two laymen to make up a committee of five.
When a vacancy occurs in a district judgeship this committee
shall moninate three lawyers for the position. From these three
the chief justice shall make an appointment to fill the vacancy.
(b) The chairmen of the several district nominating committees
shall constitute a supreme court nominating committee. When
a vacancy occurs in the supreme court this state-wide committee
shall submit to the governor the names of three lawyers, and
from these three the governor must make the appointment. (c)
When a vacancy occurs in any county judgeship the members
of the bar of that county will submit three names of lawyers, and
from these the chief justice shall fill the vacancy. All rules of
procedure for any such nominations, and the terms of the members of the nominating commissions are to be prescribed and
"fixed by the administrative council."
Each appointee to the supreme, district, and county courts is
entitled to at least two years in office, but as the section is worded,
in a state where general elections occur only once in two years, the
original appointive term will more frequently be closer to four
years, ending the first Monday in January of odd-numbered years.
If the incumbent wishes to succeed himself, he declares his intention to that effect before the preceding November election and his
name goes on "a separate judicial ballot" in his county or district,
or for the whole state if he is a supreme court justice. There is
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no party designation on the ballot, and the voter is confronted
with this simple question:
Shall Chief Justice, Justice, or Judge ............................
of the
supreme court (or district or county court) be retained in office?
Yes -------------------No ..................
If a majority of those voting on the question vote against retaining him, a vacancy will occur at the end of his term, in
January, and a new appointment will be made as described above.
If the vote is favorable to him he is retained for a term of ten
years if on the supreme court, eight years if on the district court,
and six years if on the county bench.
Faurth. Section 2 of the amendment proposes to transfer to
the judiciary practically complete power of rule-making. This appears in several provisions. (a) The supreme court "may prescribe, for all divisions of the general court, rules of practice and
procedure and of evidence, and may delegate to the other divisions
or to the administrative council such rule-making power as it
deems expedient."
(b) Section 9 provides that the administrative council "shall
have power, by rules approved by the supreme court, to alter the
jurisdiction herein conferred upon the district and county courts;
to make provision for review, by the district courts of districts
having three or more judges, of defined classes of orders, decisions, and judgments of the county and district courts, and to
condition the right of appeal in such cases to the supreme court
upon leave of that court; to create subdivisions or departments of
the district and county courts, distribute the judicial business of
such courts between such subdivisions or departments, and make
provision for the assignment thereto of judges to preside therein;
to designate the places for the sessions of district and county
courts and of the offices of clerks thereof; to change the number
and boundaries of district court districts, without, however, vacating the office of any judge during his term, and, with the concurrence of the governing bodies thereof, to merge two or more
counties into one county court district."
(c) Section 10 provides: "All rules of the supreme court and
of the administrative council adopted pursuant to the authority
conferred by this article, and all rules adopted by other divisions
of the general court pursuant to authority delegated by the supreme court, shall be filed in the office of secretary of state, and
thereupon shall have the force and effect of law and shall super-
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sede all statutes and laws inconsistent therewith." Section 16 provides that existing statutes on subjects to be covered in such rules
are continued in effect only until superseded.
Taken as a whole the amendment proposes the most farreaching change in the government of Minnesota that has ever
been submitted in drafted form by a group of responsible men.
It is a fair inference that the proponents of this amendment are
deeply dissatisfied not only with the form of government that
prevails in the state, but also with the past work of the voters, the
legislature, the governor, and the courts themselves. They must
believe that drastic remedies are required, for otherwise they
would not have proposed anything so sweeping. The aim seems
to be to establish a judicial branch of the government that is
almost entirely insulated from politics and from the other two
branches of the state government. To achieve this purpose control
over the judiciary is to be turned over in very large part to the
organized bar of the state. Let us examine a few features of the
proposal a little more closely.
THE RULE-MAKING POWER

Some years ago Dean Wigmore came forward with the novel
proposition that the legislative body, whether national or state,
"exceeds its constitutional power when it attempts to impose upon
the judiciary any rules for the dispatch of the judiciary's duties;
and that therefore all legislatively declared rules for procedure,
civil or criminal, in the courts, are void, except such as are expressly stated in the Constitution. 2 Although it must be admitted
that many legislatures have been slow to provide modern rules
of procedure for the courts, there was very little basis for this
argument in favor of court-made rules. From the founding of the
first state government in 1776 down to the present the enactment
of procedural as well as substantive law has been a proper function
of the legislature. The extent of the state legislature's power, and
its central position in the state government, were well expressed
by Chief Justice Redfield of Vermont many years ago:
It has never been questioned, so far as I know, that the American legislatures have the same unlimited power in regard to legislation which resides in the British Parliament, except where they
are restrained by written constitutions. That must be conceded,
I think, to be a fundamental principle in the political organizations
of the American States. W1,e cannot well comprehend how, upon
principle, it should be otherwise. The people must, of course,
2(1936) 20 Journal of the American Judicature Society 159-60.
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possess all legislative power originally. They have committed this
in the most general and unlimited manner to the several State
legislatures, saving only such restrictions as are imposed by the
Constitution of the United States, or of the particular state in
question. 3
Dean Wigmore's argument ignored the need for having a single
source of legislation in every state. He would stretch the doctrine
of separation of powers so as to have two such sources, the legislature and the courts, on an equal footing. But if these two, then
why not all three? Surely the executive needs such authority for
administrative purposes fully as much as the courts do for judicial
purposes, and under the separation-of-powers doctrine the same
case can be made for the executive as for the judicial branch. Then
there would be three equally legitimate sources of rule-making, and
no one would have to yield to the other. If it be argued that the
Wigmore proposal related only to matters of judicial procedure,
leaving substantive law to the legislature, the obvious answer is
that the two cannot and should not be wholly separated. The one
must be closely related to the other, lest the procedure adopted
should wholly defeat the substance.
Dean Wigmore's central idea is now embodied in the proposed judiciary amendment for Minnesota, but the amendment
puts the matter in express language and goes very far beyond
what he proposed. The supreme court is ,to make rules not only
as to practice and procedure but as to evidence. Furthermore it
may approve rules made by the administrative council covering a
number of other matters now controlled by the legislature: judicial
districts, the places where the courts shall sit, the jurisdiction of
both county and district courts, their internal subdivisions, and
various other matters. It may even delegate rule-making powers
to county and district courts and to the administrative council.
And all rules made by the supreme court "shall supersede all
statutes and laws inconsistent therewith." What is not stated is,
that if conflict be found between any legislative enactment and
any court-made rule, the supreme court, not the legislature, will
have the final word on the matter.
To the writer this whole feature of the proposed amendment
goes far beyond what is needed, and goes partly in a wrong direction. Rules of practice, procedure, and evidence need to be modernized, and kept up-to-date. To achieve this result it is necessary
to bring to bear the expert knowledge and judgment of the leaders
3
Thorpe v. Rutland & B. R. Co., (1854) 27 Vt. 140, 62 Am. Dec. 625;
1 Thayer's Cases on Constitutional Law, (1895) 157-58.
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on the bench. This it has not been easy to do in many American
states because in the short and crowded legislative sessions held
usually only once in two years it has been impossible for the
leaders of the bench to reach enough leaders in the legislature to
bring about action. The ways of democracy are a little slow and
cumbersome-but it is not necessary to push them aside so completely to achieve most or all of the result that is now desired. It is
not essential to destroy the principle of legislative supremacy in
legislative matters, and some day when the present wave of judicial
reform has given way to other tendencies even the leaders of the
bench and bar may be thankful to have left in the hands of the
people's chosen legislators the power to correct the archaic rules of
practice, procedure, and evidence that then prevail.
There is a simple way to achieve the expert drafting of the
rules that is desired while still preserving legislative supremacy.
That way is to provide that the supreme court (and no other division of the court system) shall have power to propose rules of
practice, procedure, and evidence for all branches of the General
Court. Such rules shall be laid before the two houses of the
next legislature, and if not disapproved by a majority of each
house shall have the effect of law, and shall be published with the
next session laws, and in the revised laws from time to time.
Care should be taken to make it clear that the legislature may at
any time alter or repeal any rule so adopted. This is in effect what
the British Parliament has done for judicial rule-making in its
jurisdiction, and in essence is what Congress has done in authorizing rule-making by the United States Supreme Court.
What is the most likely result of such a method? Congress has
not set aside any rules made by the Supreme Court. In Great
Britain rules so proposed are almost automatically approved, but
of course we must remember that there the courts are tied in with
the legislative and executive through the Lord Chancellor, so that
court rules proposed will have already come to the attention of,
and have had some approval from, some one in the cabinet. In
this country there are various parallels, notably the Reorganization Act passed by Congress in 1939. Under it the President
could submit "plans" for reorganizing the administrative and
executive agencies to Congress, and such plans if not disapproved
by both houses within sixty days were to go into effect. In fact
Congress, having already authorized this procedure, disapproved
none of the plans, and hastened to give some of them positive
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approval.4 When a legislative body knows that it has the reserve
power to correct mistakes and that its supremacy is recognized, its
cooperation is not hard to obtain. Furthermore the difficulty that
any clique of disgruntled members would have to get a majority in
both houses to reject a specific proposal is such that very few
rejections would be likely ever to take place.
THE SELECTION AND APPOIiTNIENT OF JUDGES

In the present constitution of the state there are express provisions for the popular election of Supreme Court justices, district
and probate judges, and justices of the peace, and "all judges
other than those provided for in this constitution." The legislature
may by a two-thirds vote establish additional courts, but it may
not legally provide for anything but election as a mode of filling
judicial offices. Furthermore the present constitution provides
that "the judges of the supreme and district courts shall be men
learned in the law," but as to other offices it states that "Every
person who . . . shall be entitled to vote at any election shall be

eligible to any office which now is, or hereafter shall be, elective
by the people in the district wherein he shall have resided thirty
days previous to such election." Thus the constitution in effect
says that probate judges, justices of the peace, court commissioners, and the judges of any courts created by the legislature
need not be lawyers.
These provisions represent the advanced democratic thought
of nearly a century ago, and it is not surprising that the standards
and the methods of electing judges that they prescribe have not
produced entirely satisfactory results. The remarkable thing is
that they have worked as well as they have. As a matter of fact
the Supreme Court justices and the District Court judges of
Minnesota have a deservedly high standing among the courts of
all the states. It would be difficult to prove that any but a few
states, even among those with appointive judges, have higher
standards of judicial personnel. No serious scandal has ever
brought disgrace upon the higher courts in Minnesota, and the
Supreme Court has had some justices who were among the best
legal minds of their generation. Members of the bar have assisted
in maintaining these standards by inducing many able lawyers
to stand for office, and the voters, -when advised by bar com4See John D. Millett and Lindsay Rogers. The Legislative Veto and
the Reorganization Act of 1939, (1941) 1 Public Administration Rev.
176-189. Cf. Harvey Mansfield, The Legislative Veto and the Deportation
of Aliens, (1941) 1 Public Administration Rev. 281-286.
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mittees, have not been undiscriminating in their choices. Equally
important has been the fact that most of the judges of the two
higher courts, and many municipal and probate judges, have first
gone on the bench by appointment of the governor who has the
authority to fill vacancies, and that the governors have taken this
responsibility seriously. In 1940 one careful student of the situation wrote as follows:
"All seven present members of the supreme court came into
office originally by appointment of the governor. Of the fifty
state district court judges now on the bench, thirty-one were
originally appointed by the governor. Four other members of
the present district court bench received previous appointments
as municipal judges or judges of probate, and were subsequently
elected as district court judges." 5
This writer pointed out also that re-elections are very common.
In 1940 thirty-six of the fifty district court judges had been elected
two or more times. Indeed the increasing age of the judges and
numerous cases of death and incapacity in office due to age, were
described as creating something of a problem.
The situation is, nonetheless, far from perfect. In some places
the failure of the bar to exert leadership in promoting the appointment and election of well qualified lawyers has left the governor
and the voters with inadequate guidance. No doubt a number of
men of little or no judicial experience or competence have put
themselves forward and have thus risen to high judicial office.
Some of these were undoubtedly cases where the needed experts
in the law were not even on tap, either as candidates or as unofficial nominating committees.
It has been argued, also, that it is undignified if not positively
degrading to the courts to have the judges forced to seek election.
Speaking still as a layman the writer of this article has never
felt that way about it. One can smile a little when an obviously
incompetent person seeks judicial office, and one can be considerably distressed when competent men either fail to run or are
subjected to vicious attack when they do. But when intelligent
and public-spirited groups of citizens including many lawyers
sponsor the candidacy of an honest and able man, it is no disgrace
either to the candidate or to his sponsors-and that whether he
wins or loses. And when it is so easy for a good judge to get
re-elected, there should be an increased incentive for local bar
committees to sponsor qualified men. There is unquestionably a
•Malcolm Moos, Judicial Elections and Partisan Endorsement of Judicial
Candidates in Minnesota, (1941) 35 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 69-75.
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certain amount of arduous and even disagreeable work that lawyers
have to do when putting forward a candidate for the bench, but
they should realize that in this way they are contributing to the
education of the people. They are making the courts seem to be
an important part of democratic government and are creating
good will for lawyers and judges too. A little rubbing of elbows
with common people is not undignified.
To remedy the ills in the present system and to provide Minnesota with a body of judges even better than that of today, the
amendment proposes, among other things, to eliminate ordinary
election entirely as a means of choosing judges. By "ordinary election" is meant the present system in which two or more candidates
may strive for the nomination, and two nominees for each position
run against each other in the final campaign. For all practical purposes the function of making nominations is to be turned over to
local bar organizations or to committees of the bar. In the district
nominating committees, it is true, two laymen appointed by the
governor are to be pitted against three lawyers, but it is clear
that if the ordinary layman's deference to the man "learned in
the law" is not enough to cow them into acquiescence, the two can
certainly be outvoted by the three. For county court positions it
is the members of the local bar who make all the nominations. The
nominating committee for supreme court positions is to consist of
the chairmen of all the district nominating committees. Here again
for several reasons that need hardly be stated, lawyers are almost
certain to constitute the overwhelming majority.
Following nomination comes appointment, not popular election.
The chief justice, not the governor as at present, is to appoint to the
district bench and also to the new county court. The governor is
to make appointments only to positions in the supreme court. In
each case, too, the appointment must be made from a list of three
submitted by the appropriate nominating committee. There is no
provision even for the governor or chief justice to reject an entire
list and to call for a new one. Thus the members of the bar come
very close to controlling the appointment.
The governors of Minnesota have done a far better than average job in judicial appointments, but the way in which their choices
are to be hedged about by the new plan shows no appreciation of
this fact. Quite the contrary is true. The governor is to be restricted as much as possible, and any change in the political views
or social philosophies of the judges is practically prevented. Suppose a new governor comes in as a result of the defeat of a party
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long in power. He will find himself more hampered than Jefferson
did after the Federalists under John Adams had created and
filled all possible judicial offices before retiring. What can the
governor do? Appoint two laymen to each district nominating
committee? Oh, no; at least not at once. The administrative council consisting of nine judges chosen originally by the dominant
groups in the bar associations are authorized to fix the terms of
the members of nominating committees and that without time
limit. A new governor may get to appoint one lay committee
member in each district in his first term, one out of five. Even
if he could appoint two he could not greatly influence the nominations made. Yes, and even if he could appoint a majority of the
members of the district nominating committee, which he cannot,
he could not finally appoint any of those nominated for the district bench. It is the chief justice of the supreme court who is
to do that. Thus the governor will find himself prevented from
exercising any real influence on appointments to the district bench,
without any contact at all with nominations and appointments to
the county courts, and required to take one of three nominees submitted to him by a committee of lawyers for any supreme court
vacancy. This is, of course, as drastic a change in the relationship of the governor to judicial appointments as could well have
been devised.
The voters' part in the process is also radically reduced and
substantially changed. Under the proposed plan no one will ever
again reach judicial office through having been nominated and
elected by the voters. All will come in originally by appointment.
After a judge has served from two to four years by appointment,
the voters may vote to retain or reject him, but they are given no
choice as beween A and B, or Jones and Johnson. They may
kick a judge out the back door but not let one in at the front.
Having no right to select a successor, how could they be other
than apathetic about removing a judge? What is offered to the
voters is not a real right of election at all.
It may be argued, of course, that the functions of the courts
are such that the judges should be entirely expert and nonpolitical, that the lawyers in their bar associations are non-political
experts on matters of law and courts, and that turning the courts
over so completely to control by them is the only way to insure
the desired result of having an expert, impartial, and honest judiciary. The present writer finds that he must disagree in part with
both the premise and the conclusion.
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In all countries the courts of law have a close and necessary
connection with the government of the day. The British system
recognizes this by having the Lord Chancellor, a member of the
cabinet and of the House of Lords, serve as head of the court
system. Our own national Constitution provides that the President
shall make and the Senate approve all national judicial appointments. The states give recognition to the same principle in a
variety of ways. Only very recently, as in the present Minnesota
proposal and in the new Missouri method of selecting judges, has
there been any effort to divorce the courts from the rest of the
government.
The power of the courts in this country to pass upon the constitutionality of legislation reveals the courts as exercising the
very highest political function. James M. Beck wrote of the
United States Supreme Court as "this extraordinary politicojuridical tribunal." The law is not a discipline like mathematics
that always comes out with exactly the same answer for the same
question. There is ample room for choice, and the choice is often,
of necessity, not legal but economic or political. The changes in
the views of the Supreme Court from Marshall to Taney, or from
White to Taft to Hughes, or from the court of before 1937 to
that of this day are but a few of the most important examples.
Even in the states we hear often of political decisions by the
courts, and this is no disparagement of the judges. When the law
affords no precise answer to a question that must be answered,
the judges need to reach into their philosophies, their social, political, and economic views, for the answers. To say that a thing is
political is to make a neutral statement. Politics can produce a
Declaration of Independence, a Constitution of the United States,
or an Emancipation Proclamation just as readily as it can produce
municipal extravagance or corruption. The important thing is not
to try to eliminate entirely the political function of the courts, but
to see to it that all court decisions are made as intelligently and
honestly as possible and that those decisions shall not upset the
necessary work of the other two branches of government. That
is why the courts, at least at the top, should have a continuing
and close relationship to the executive and legislature, and to the
people.
The argulment that bar association nomination of judges will
eliminate politics cannot be accepted. Two kinds of politics here
need to be distinguished, the politics of patronage and the politics
of public policy. The former will certainly not be eliminated.
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Judicial offices must be filled and under the new dispensation they
will be more valuable than ever. Lawyers will seek preferment,
and cliques and groups will organize within the bar to influence
nominations and appointments. The district and supreme court
nominating committees and the chief justice of the supreme court
will soon learn what President Taft meant when he said that every
appointment made creates one ingrate and ten enemies for the
appointer.' Since the proposed amendment lays down no standards whatever (whether of age, experience, learning, or ability
to pass an examination on judicial functions) those who are not
nominated, or who are nominated but not appointed, will find it
easy to charge favoritism and even worse. The chief justice of
the supreme court, with his power to appoint all district and
county judges, no matter how high his standards, will find himself
beset by patronage politics. The "heat" will be on him time and
again.
The politics of public policy will also have its effects. Lawyers
are citizens and they have views on public questions. It is unthinkable that these views will not be present when the district
bar elects its three members of the nominating committee, or when
the latter committee nominates to fill a vacancy on the bench. A
lawyer whose economic and political views do not conform to
those of the majority will get but little consideration. Is it merely
rhetorical to ask how many members of the present United States
Supreme Court would be likely to be in their present positions
if a committee of the American Bar Association had controlled the
nominations within the rule of three? Whatever any one may
think of those justices, individually or collectively, it must be
recognized that this court is more nearly in line with the views
of Marshall than any court for several generations, and that
there is less complaint against the court today than in many
decades.
The conclusion of this argument is that an appointive judiciary
would probably bring about a real improvement in the courts of
Minnesota, but that the method of appointment proposed is untried and largely indefensible. Instead of keeping the experts (the
lawyers in this case) on tap, to advise the governor on appointments, it aims to put them on top. It delegates to the organized
bar, a group that is politically and legally not responsible to any
one, the control of the only entry way to the entire third branch
';William Howard Taft, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers, p. 66.
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of government. It endeavors to cut the courts off almost entirely
from the rest of government instead of integrating them more
closely with the other two branches. At the very time when the
separation of powers doctrine is being modified in practice in the
direction of more unified government, it goes in the opposite direction. With the purpose of improving the selection of judges it
practically abandons over eighty years of state experience with
appointments by the governor and election by the voters, an experience that has been good, on the whole, and that has given
Minnesota a high-standing judiciary.
Improvements could certainly be made in many ways without
the abandonment of this experience. There could be some more
regular way for the bar to advise the governor on appointments
and the voters on candidates for election. The bar could try to
set up and publish definite standards for judicial office-holding,
and inform the public more fully about these standards. A complete system of appointment by the governor for district and
supreme courts, followed by some form of popular approval at
the next regular election, would probably bring real improvement.
Since the voters elect the governor every two years as their principal statewide leader this arrangement would probably keep them
in sufficiently close touch with the judiciary to satisfy the requirements of democratic government.
THE RETURN OF THE GUILD

The proposal under consideration has one aspect that needs
to be emphasized. American society appears to be undergoing a
process of stratification and crystallization. The old freedom and
fluidity are passing. Strong combinations of labor and of capital,
with resultant monopoly conditions and rigidities in wages, prices,
and employment, are already familiar facts. Specialized vocational
and professional groups are also drawing ever more tightly their
lines, and are attempting by various means to get monopolistic controls and thus to set their own standards for admission, for compensation, and for service.
In the ranks of business the "price-cutter" is one of the most
hated of men. Jurisdictional disputes, high union dues, and restrictions on apprenticeships are common phenomena of the
labor movement. Among the professions,-doctors, lawyers, engineers, dentists, and others,-there are efforts to raise entrance
standards, restrict numbers, control methods of practice, forbid
"unauthorized practice," set rates of charge, and bring all the
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practitioners under strict control. The contagion of these ideas
spreads outward into every walk of life, so that plumbers, house
painters, electricians, "beauticians," and what not, sooner or later
get organized for the same purposes. Most of them try also to
get legislation to support their claims. Such a law, if passed,7
merely takes the place of the king's license to the ancient guild.
All this is done in the name of improved service and the general welfare; and in some ways no doubt the public gets a benefit
more or less forced upon it. But it is also still true that organized
professions develop interests that are contrary to progress and
public welfare. In the case of the medical associations we have
seen how their efforts to preserve old practices and protect their
individual incomes stand in the way of new methods of group
medicine.
The legal profession presents today one of the clearest and
most advanced cases of the revival of the old guild system. Even
before the recent movement began the lawyers had complete control throughout the land of the highest judicial offices, the Department of Justice, State attorney general's offices, the most important
posts as prosecuting attorneys and city and county attorneys, numerous high administrative and regulatory posts, many governorships and legislative offices, not to mention their well entrenched
positions in corporate business and their almost complete control
of the practice of law. This situation was as it should be because
the special knowledge of the lawyers fully entitled them to these
positions.
What the profession has recently been demanding is considerably more: 1. A raising of the standards of admission and a further restriction of the numbers admitted to the practice of law.
2. An all-inclusive bar organization (the integrated bar) in every
state, so as to bring all practicing attorneys under stricter discipline. 3. Complete elimination of the "unauthorized practice of
law," which means in effect a prohibition against laymen and
corporations operating even on the outer margins of legal practice.
The proposed constitutional amendment now before us takes
two steps beyond even these claims. They are: 1. The practical
elimination of laymen from minor judicial offices by the abolition
of such offices as are now open to laymen, and by the express requirement that only lawyers may be appointed as judges. The
edge of this proposal is only partly dulled by the provision for
7See J. A. C. Grant, The Guild Returns to America, (1942)
Journal of Politics 303-336, 458-477.
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the appointment of "magistrates" who may be laymen. 2. The
constitutional recognition of the bar organization in' counties and
judicial districts for the purpose of nominating lawyers for appointment.
Much might be said of the dangers to society that are inherent in the rise of the guild system and the guild spirit, but
that matter cannot be analyzed here. One thing on which men
ought to be able to agree is that no group should be a judge
in its own cause just as no man should be in his own case. Above
all groups there needs to stand a government that, in all its
branches, legislative, executive, and judicial, is not beholden to
any group or guild. Just as it would be against public policy to
turn all public health work over to the state medical association,
or all public education over to some inclusive but still-to-beorganized guild of educators, so it is wrong to attempt to entrench the organized bar in the virtual control of judicial nominations and appointments. Lawyers are needed to serve as judges
and attorneys. Lawyers should fill all such offices, but each one
should go into office without any strings upon him. Each one
should be responsible solely to the people of his district or the
state, and not to a professional guild. The supreme court with its
great authority 'over the practice of law as well as its great responsibility for the welfare of the state should be in no way
specially obligated to the bar.
CONCLUSION

There are other things about the proposal that the writer had
thought to discuss. Much of what is proposed deserves the hearty
support of all citizens: the unified court, the elimination of jurisdictional difficulties, the centralized business management proposals, the retirement and pension system, for example. The committee is entitled to the thanks of all people for having worked
out these provisions. Evidently the committee did not go into
certain closely related matters such as a merit system for the
court's employees, budgeting and accounting, the relationship of
their proposal to the attorney general's office and the state department of justice idea, and the effects of their plan upon the home
rule spirit and self-government in cities and counties. There is
so much that is good in the whole proposal that the present author
regrets he must disagree so strongly with the recommendations
on rule-making and the selection of judges. As to these points he
hopes there will be a thorough reconsideration before the plan is
widely presented to the public.

